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1Capital and macroeconomic instability in a discrete-time model with
forward-looking interest rate rules
Abstract
We establish the necessary and su±cient conditions for local real determinacy in a
discrete-time production economy with monopolistic competition and a quadratic price ad-
justment cost under forward-looking policy rules, for the case where capital is in exogenously
¯xed supply and the case with endogenous capital accumulation. Using these conditions,
we show that (i) indeterminacy is more likely to occur with a greater share of payment to
capital in value-added production cost; (ii) indeterminacy can be more or less likely to occur
with constant capital than with variable capital; (iii) indeterminacy is more likely to occur
when prices are modelled as jump variables than as predetermined variables; (iv) indeter-
minacy is less likely to occur with a greater degree of steady-state monopolistic distortions;
and (v) indeterminacy is less likely to occur with a greater degree of price stickiness or
with a higher steady-state in°ation rate. In contrast to some existing research, our analysis
indicates that capital tends to lead to macroeconomic instability by a®ecting ¯rms' pricing
behavior in product markets rather than households' arbitrage activity in asset markets even
under forward-looking policy rules.
JEL classi¯cation: E12, E31, E52
Keywords: Capital; Indeterminacy; Forward-looking interest rate rules; Jump prices; Prede-
termined prices
21. Introduction
As central banks around the world have become more independent and transparent in the
past two decades or so, more systematic conduct of monetary policy has become increasingly
popular in the policymaking circle. Most practices of systematic monetary policy have taken
the form of interest rate feedback rules that set a short-term nominal interest rate as an
increasing function of expected future in°ation. This trend, which began in the industrial
and middle-income countries in the late 1980s, and spread to the transition and emerging-
market economies in the late 1990s, has become a practical phenomenon worldwide.
Those past years have also witnessed a large body of academic research on whether
interest rate rules may lead to real indeterminacy of equilibrium, which would open the
door to welfare-reducing °uctuations unrelated to economic fundamentals.1 This literature,
beginning with the seminal work of Sargent and Wallace (1975) and McCallum (1981), has
accumulated some insightful results, which have greatly enhanced our understanding of the
issue.2 While most of the studies focus on the implications of how the rate of interest a®ects
consumption-savings decisions, the channel by which the rate of interest a®ects investment
decisions has also begun to draw attention recently.
Dupor (2001) analyzes the issue of local real determinacy in a continuous-time model with
a quadratic nominal price adjustment cost and endogenous capital accumulation, where the
monetary authority sets a nominal interest rate as a function of the instantaneous rate of
in°ation. As we know, the instantaneous rate of in°ation in a continuous-time setting is
the right-derivative of the logged price level and, thus, the discrete-time counterpart of a
continuous-time policy rule that sets the interest rate in response to the instantaneous rate
1In a recent analysis, King and Wolman (2004) demonstrate how discretionary monetary policy can lead
to multiple equilibria and sunspot °uctuations by generating dynamic complementarity between forward-
looking private agents and a discretionary monetary authority.
2Important contributions include Leeper (1991), Taylor (1993), Kerr and King (1996), Bernanke and
Woodford (1997), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), Christiano and Gust (1999), Clarida, Gal¶ ³, and
Gertler (2000), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), and Benhabib, Schmitt-Groh¶ e, and Uribe (2001a, b), among
many others. See, for example, the references cited in Taylor (1999) and Dupor (2001). See, also, John and
Wolman (1999, 2004).
3of in°ation is characterized by forward-looking policy that responds to expected future in°a-
tion.3 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) obtain a necessary condition for local real determinacy
under such a forward-looking rule in a discrete-time model with partial nominal price adjust-
ment and endogenous capital accumulation. While both papers emphasize the endogenous
nature of capital in their modelling and, in particular, an implied no-arbitrage condition
that links (expected) real return on bonds to (expected) real return on capital, prices are
modelled as predetermined variables in the former but as jump variables in the latter.
In this paper, we obtain the necessary and su±cient conditions for local real determinacy
in a discrete-time production economy with monopolistic competition and a quadratic cost
of nominal price adjustment4 under forward-looking interest rate rules, for the cases with
constant and variable capital, and with predetermined and jump prices. To our knowledge,
in the literature on discrete-time sticky-price models this paper is the ¯rst to establish
a necessary and su±cient condition for real determinacy with investment under forward-
looking interest rate rules. In addition to their own interests, these necessary and su±cient
conditions allow us to gain important insights into the determinacy issue that have not been
explored in the existing literature. Using these conditions we ¯nd that,
(i) indeterminacy is more likely to occur with a greater share of payment to capital in
value-added production cost, regardless of whether capital supply is constant or variable;
(ii) indeterminacy can be either more or less likely to occur with constant capital than
with variable capital, depending on the values of parameters, in general, and the cost share
of capital, in particular;
(iii) indeterminacy is more likely to occur when prices are modelled as jump variables
than as predetermined variables;
3See, for example, Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995, p. 522, Footnote 10) for an enlightening discussion of this
point.
4This approach of modelling nominal price adjustment cost has been used in both the continuous-time
and the discrete-time literature. For examples in the continuous-time setting, see Benhabib et al. (2001a,
b), in addition to Dupor (2001) and others. For examples in the discrete-time setting, see Rotemberg (1982),
Hairault and Portier (1993), Ireland (2000), and Kim (2000), among many others. Our choice to use this
approach here allows us to deal with two price-adjustment timings often used in the literature in a uni¯ed
framework in a transparent way.
4(iv) indeterminacy is less likely to occur with a greater steady-state monopolistic markup
of price over marginal cost;
(v) indeterminacy is less likely to occur with a greater degree of price stickiness or with
a higher steady-state in°ation rate.
In the process of deriving the above results, we gain insights into how capital tends to
induce macroeconomic instability under forward-looking interest rate rules. The lesson is
that capital matters for macroeconomic instability through a®ecting the pricing behavior of
¯rms in product markets (and thus the New Phillips curve), regardless of whether it is in
¯xed or variable supply. This provides an alternative perspective from the intuition o®ered
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005). They attribute the tendency of variable capital to inducing
indeterminacy to the fact that the investment activity of households in ¯nancial markets
brings a zero eigenvalue into the dynamic equilibrium system via a no-arbitrage condition
between investing in capital and holding bonds, which, they argue, is what makes forward-
looking interest rate rules more prone to indeterminacy than if there is no (or a ¯xed stock
of) capital.5
To help make our perspective transparent, we ¯rst show that local determinacy analysis
in the constant-capital case is an analysis of a system of two linear di®erence equations
(a New Phillips curve and a consumption Euler equation) in two jump variables, so that
whether there is determinacy depends on whether the two eigenvalues of this linear system
both have larger than unit modulus. Capital here matters for indeterminacy through how
its share in value-added production cost a®ects ¯rms' pricing behavior in product markets
and thus the New Phillips curve.
We then illustrate for the variable-capital case that the arbitrage activity of households in
asset markets between investing in capital and bonds brings with it two additional equations,
5Carlstrom and Fuerst's (2005) intuition for why capital matters for macroeconomic stability under
forward-looking interest rate rules contrasts with those o®ered under current-looking policy rules by Benhabib
and Eusepi (2005) and Sveen and Weinke (2005) that emphasize how capital a®ects ¯rms' pricing behavior
through a cost channel. What we show here is that how capital a®ects ¯rms' pricing behavior is still the key
player for indeterminacy even under forward-looking policy rules.
5a no-arbitrage condition and a capital accumulation equation. We show that although this
introduces a zero eigenvalue (corresponding to the no-arbitrage condition) and a greater than
unit eigenvalue (corresponding to the capital accumulation equation) under forward-looking
interest rate rules, it also brings in two additional variables, a jump variable and a prede-
termined variable. We further show how these additional two equations and two variables
can form a self-closed subsystem, and thus can be dropped out of the determinacy analysis
entirely. We show that, as a result, local determinacy analysis here becomes an analysis of
the consumption Euler equation and the New Phillips curve, just as in the constant-capital
case. Just as there, whether there is determinacy here depends on whether the two eigen-
values of this two-equation system both have greater than unit modulus, and capital here
matters for determinacy also through how its share in value-added production cost a®ects
¯rms' pricing behavior in product markets and thus the New Phillips curve.6
It is worth emphasizing that the necessary and su±cient conditions for real determinacy
that we derive in this paper are essential for obtaining the aforementioned results (i)-(v). We
view the comparison between the cases with constant and variable capital based on (i) and
(ii) an important contribution to the literature. The comparison between the cases with jump
and predetermined prices based on (iii) is useful for understanding in part why indeterminacy
is more likely to occur in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) where prices are jump variables
than in Dupor (2001) where prices are predetermined variables.7 The role of steady-state
monopolistic distortions for macroeconomic stability under forward-looking policy rules as
reported in (iv) is also a valuable contribution. Our ¯ndings (v) under forward-looking policy
rules contrast the results obtained under current-looking rules under which indeterminacy is
6Given that the variable-capital case and the constant-capital case can be viewed as the case with zero
and with in¯nite capital adjustment cost, respectively, one should not be too surprised by our ¯nding that
the zero eigenvalue brought about by the investment activity of households in the variable-capital model is
not the key story for why capital can make forward-looking interest rate rules susceptible to macroeconomic
instability: when one goes from the case with zero capital adjustment cost, as in our variable-capital model
here, into the case with an in¯nitesimal capital adjustment cost, the zero eigenvalue would disappear, but
the (in)determinacy region would remain almost unchanged.
7The choice of discrete time versus continuous time in modelling per se can also make a di®erence in
implications for determinacy that is beyond the di®erence between jump prices and predetermined prices.
We do not attempt to address this issue here.
6more likely to occur with a greater degree of price stickiness or with a higher steady-state
in°ation rate.8
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, which incorporates
the case with jump prices and the case with predetermined prices in a uni¯ed framework,
and which allows for both the case with constant capital and the case with variable capital.
Section 3 derives equilibrium conditions for the constant-capital case and shows that
determinacy analysis here is an analysis of a two-equation system, and that capital matters
for indeterminacy through how its share in production a®ects the New Phillips curve.
Sections 4 and 5 derive equilibrium conditions for the variable-capital case and show
how the (in)determinacy of this four-equation system is equivalent to the (in)determinacy
of a two-equation system similar to the two-equation system for the constant-capital case.
It is demonstrated that the basic mechanisms within the constant-capital and the variable-
capital models that ensure determinacy are similar, and that endogenous capital matters for
indeterminacy also through how its share in production a®ects the New Phillips curve.
Section 6 presents our main results: the necessary and su±cient conditions for local real
determinacy under forward-looking interest rate rules, for both the constant-capital model
and the variable-capital model, and with both jump prices and predetermined prices. It
then applies these conditions to establish the results (i)-(v) reported above and provides
some underlying intuitions. Section 7 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the appendix.
8Under current-looking interest rate rules Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) and Sveen and Weinke (2005)
¯nd that a higher degree of price stickiness tends to give rise to a greater indeterminacy region. They use
models with partial nominal price adjustment, and their analysis is based on log-linearization around a zero
steady-state in°ation rate and thus is not able to explore the implications of steady-state in°ation rate for
determinacy. Using a model featuring Taylor-type staggered price setting Hornstein and Wolman (2005) ¯nd
that a greater steady-state in°ation rate makes indeterminacy more likely to occur under current-looking
interest rate rules. Our results obtained in a separate study under current-looking interest rate rules in a
model with a quadratic price adjustment cost are consistent with these authors' ¯ndings.
72. A Model with Price Adjustment Cost and Capital
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;::: The economy is populated by a large number


















, for Ã > 0; v > 0; ° > 0; (1)
where Pt denotes the nominal price that a unit's ¯rm charges at t for the good it produces
in the period, and J is either 0 or 1, corresponding to two price-adjustment timings often
used in discrete-time models of monopolistic competition: The speci¯cation is such that, at
date t, the ¯rm chooses Pt+J, taking Pt¡1+J as given; thus, prices e®ective in the current
period are set in the current period if J = 0, but were set in the previous period if J = 1.
As such, individual prices and, by symmetry, the price level are jump variables if J = 0,
but they are predetermined variables if J = 1.9 The other notations in (1) are standard:
½ 2 (0;1) is a discount factor, ct is the unit's household consumption in period t, which is
a composite of goods produced by all ¯rms, nt is the household's labor supply in period t,
¹ Pt is the economy-wide price level, ¼¤ is the steady-state value of the gross rate of change
in the price level, and Mt+1 is the household's nominal money balances at the end of period
t.10 Note that the linearity of the period utility function in labor hours is a consequence of
9This distinction between jump prices and predetermined prices is valid regardless of whether there is a
price adjustment cost (° > 0) or there is no price adjustment cost (° = 0). In fact, the idea of modelling
prices as preset in models of monopolistic competition in discrete time goes back at least to Svensson's
(1986) work, which does not feature any price adjustment cost. In the continuous-time literature, this idea
can be traced back to an even earlier date, to Dornbush's (1976) model with no price adjustment cost.
Interestingly, subsequent studies in the continuous-time setup that do model price adjustment costs almost
entirely follow this convention about the timing of price setting. See Benhabib et al. (2001a, b), Kimball
(1995), in addition to Dupor (2001) and others. In contrast, subsequent studies in the discrete-time setup
that do model price adjustment costs mostly choose to use the alternative timing convention and model
prices as jump variables. See Rotemberg (1982), Hairault and Portier (1993), Ireland (2000), and Kim
(2000), among others. Although the discrete-time model of Dupor (2003) assumes preset prices, it does
not feature any price adjustment cost. To our knowledge, the present paper provides the ¯rst discrete-time
model with a price adjustment cost that features prices as predetermined variables. It, in fact, models the
two timing conventions in a uni¯ed framework.
10We adopt here the convention of end-of-period real money balances in the utility function. Were we to
assume beginning-of-period real money balances in the utility function, the result obtained herein for the
case with J = 1 would hold in its exact form, but it would be quite easy to get real indeterminacy for the
case with J = 0 under the assumption of a Ricardian ¯scal policy, since in this case the initial-period real
8aggregation when labor is assumed to be indivisible and such a utility function is consistent
with any labor supply elasticity at the individual level (e.g., Hansen, 1985; Rogerson, 1988).
At each date t, the ¯rm inputs labor and capital services, ~ nt and ~ kt, to produce its
di®erentiated good yt according to




t , where ® 2 [0;1); ® + ¯ = 1: (2)
The ¯rm is an input-price taker, but a monopolistic competitor in its product market. With
markup pricing, ® and ¯ determine respectively the share of payments to capital and labor
in value-added production cost rather than in gross output (i.e., the cost share as opposed
to the revenue share), as will be made more transparent below. It is assumed that, given the
price Pt that the ¯rm charges for its product, it must produce enough to meet the demand










t denotes aggregate output, which, as the consumption good, is a composite of indi-
vidually di®erentiated goods produced via a Dixit-Stiglitz technology, and Á is the elasticity
of substitution between the di®erentiated goods that is equal to the price elasticity of this
demand function faced by the individual ¯rm. Note that Á < ¡1 is a necessary assump-
tion for a well-de¯ned model of monopolistic competition. As we will show below, the ratio
Á=(Á + 1) determines the steady-state monopolistic distortion measured by the markup of
price over marginal cost.
The objective of the household-¯rm unit is to maximize (1), subject to (2), (3), and a











yt ¡ rt~ kt ¡ wt~ nt + rtkt + wtnt ¡ ~ yt ¡ ¿t; (4)
where ~ yt denotes the household's demand for the composite good in period t, kt is its capital
supply at the beginning of period t, which, as the consumption good and aggregate output,
is measured in units of the composite of the individually di®erentiated goods, Bt¡1 is its
bond-holdings acquired in period t ¡ 1, Rt¡1 is the gross nominal rate of return on holding
the bond from t ¡ 1 to t, wt and rt are real wage and real capital rental rate, respectively,
and ¿t is a real lump-sum tax (or subsidy).
The speci¯cation of the °ow budget constraint (4) implies that a nominal bond carried
from period t ¡ 1, Bt¡1, matures at the beginning of period t, so that Bt¡1Rt¡1 is available
in period t. An alternative speci¯cation is: (Mt+1 + Bt+1=Rt)= ¹ Pt = (Mt + Bt)= ¹ Pt + ¢ ¢ ¢
(e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2000). These two speci¯cations lead to identical ¯rst-order
conditions for bonds.
This setup allows for both the case where capital is in exogenously ¯xed supply and the
case with endogenous capital accumulation. In the case with exogenous capital supply (at
either aggregate or individual household level), the ¯xed amount of capital available for ¯rms
to hire never depreciates and new capital good is never produced, although the demand for
capital by ¯rms can still be endogenously determined.11 In this case, we have
kt = k0, and ~ yt ´ ct, for all t ¸ 0; (5)
where k0 denotes the household's initial holding of capital, which is treated as given. In the
11It could be assumed alternatively that ¯rms directly own capital in a ¯xed stock. Since there is no
relative price distortion in a symmetric equilibrium in our present setting, it does not matter whether it is
assumed that each ¯rm has the same amount of capital never being relocated, or it is assumed that capital
in a ¯xed stock on aggregate can be relocated among ¯rms. Either way, kt, ~ kt, and rt would drop out of
the budget constraint (4) altogether. The result to be presented below for the case with exogenous capital
supply would hold in its exact form under these alternative assumptions.
10case with endogenous capital accumulation, both the supply of and the demand for capital are
determined endogenously. In this case, (5) is replaced with a capital accumulation equation,
kt+1 = it + (1 ¡ ±)kt, and ~ yt ´ ct + it; (6)
where ± is the capital depreciation rate, and it denotes the household's investment in units
of the composite good during period t.
3. Equilibria with Exogenous Capital Supply
At each date t, a household-¯rm unit chooses ct, Mt+1, Bt, nt, ~ nt, ~ kt, and Pt+J to maximize
(1) subject to (2){(5), taking as given the initial conditions M0, B¡1, k0, and PJ¡1, as well
as the time paths for ¿t, Rt, Y d








































The resulting ¯rst-order conditions, when coupled with the market-clearing conditions for








































°¼t+J¡1(¼t+J¡1 ¡ ¼¤) ¡ ½°¼t+J(¼t+J ¡ ¼¤)
½Jyt+J
= Á¹t+J + ¸t+J; (13)




we have used ¼t to denote the expected in°ation rate ¹ Pt+1= ¹ Pt so our notion is consistent with
the one used in the continuous-time setup where the instantaneous rate of in°ation is given
by the right-hand derivative of the log of the price level. This also implies that the discrete-
time counterpart of a standard continuous-time nominal interest rate rule that responds to
the instantaneous rate of in°ation is characterized by a forward-looking rule under which
the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate as a function of the expected future
in°ation rate. For the purpose of our local analysis, it is without loss of generality to consider
a linear rule
Rt = R
¤ + q(¼t ¡ ¼
¤); (14)
where q ¸ 0 measures the degree of activeness (or passiveness) of the policy around the
steady state and R¤ denotes the steady-state value of the nominal interest rate.
Combining the steady-state versions of (11), (12), and (13), one can show that the ratio
Á=(Á+1), given by the inverse of (1¡¹=¸), is equal to the steady-state markup of price over
unit cost, which is also marginal cost under the assumed constant-return-to-scale production
technology. Note also that, with markup pricing, the share of payment to capital (labor)
input in value-added production cost (i.e., the cost share) equals the product of the share of
12capital (labor) input in gross output (i.e., the revenue share) and the steady-state markup
of price over marginal cost. It then follows from (12) and (11) that ® and ¯ measure the
share of payments to capital and labor, respectively, in value-added production cost.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to simplify the equilibrium conditions (7)-(13) into
a system of equations that are key to our determinacy analysis.12 One such equation is
derived by substituting (7), (10), and (11) into (13), which yields
°¼t+J¡1(¼t+J¡1 ¡ ¼
















Determinacy analysis in this case requires (15) and (16), along with the policy rule (14). Here,
capital matters through how its share in value-added production cost (® = 1 ¡ ¯) a®ects
the New Phillips curve (15), and policy matters through its interaction with households'
intertemporal consumption decisions, as prescribed by (16).
In deriving (15) and (16), we have used neither (8) nor (12). Equation (8) is not used,
since under an interest rate policy rule, money supply is endogenously determined, and real
money balances Mt+1= ¹ Pt is solved as a residual from (8), once the paths for consumption and
the expected in°ation rate are pinned down. Yet, (8) does imply that, for real determinacy,
not only real quantities but the expected in°ation rate have to be determinate in equilibrium.
Equation (12) is not used since in the present case with exogenous capital supply, this capital
demand equation plays only a residual role to pin down equilibrium capital rental rate.
To proceed, denote by x¤ the steady-state value of a variable xt, and ^ xt ´ logxt ¡ logx¤
12Given the assumption of a Ricardian ¯scal policy, neither the government's public budget constraint
nor the household's private budget constraint is of any use for our equilibrium determinacy analysis.
13the percentage deviation of the variable from its steady-state value. It follows that
xt = x
¤e
^ xt = x
¤(1 + ^ xt) + O(k^ xtk
2);
where O(k^ xtk2) summarizes terms of the second or higher orders. Using this expression to
rewrite (14), (15), and (16), and dropping all terms higher than the ¯rst order, we have
½°¼
¤2^ ¼t+J = °¼
¤2^ ¼t+J¡1 + ½
JÁvn¤
¯2 ^ ct+J; (17)
^ ct+1 = (½q ¡ 1)^ ¼t + ^ ct: (18)
Local determinacy analysis in this case with exogenous capital supply involves an analysis of
the log-linearized New Phillips curve, (17), and consumption Euler equation, (18), as linear
di®erence equations in two jump variables, ¼ and c, where the log-linearized policy rule is
embedded. Thus, whether there is determinacy depends on whether the two eigenvalues of
this linear system both have larger than unit modulus. Capital here matters for determinacy
through how its share in value-added production cost (® = 1 ¡ ¯) a®ects ¯rms' pricing
behavior in product markets and thus the New Phillips curve.
4. Equilibria with Endogenous Capital Accumulation
At each date t, in addition to those choice variables speci¯ed in the previous section, a
household also chooses capital to be supplied in the next date, kt+1, to maximize (1) subject
to (2), (3), (4), and (6), taking as given the initial conditions and the time paths for aggregate








































The resulting equilibrium conditions contain (7)-(13), as in their exact forms, plus the ¯rst-
order condition for the household's endogenous capital supply,




This capital supply equation, when coupled with the bond-holding condition (9), gives rise
to a no-arbitrage condition,
Rt
¼t
= rt+1 + 1 ¡ ±; (20)
which links the expected real return on bonds to the expected real return on capital when
there is no arbitrage opportunity between investing in these two types of assets. In addition,
there is now the capital accumulation equation which, when combined with the market-





t + (1 ¡ ±)kt ¡ ct: (21)
Here, capital matters through how its share in value-added production cost a®ects (21), in
addition to (15), and policy matters through interacting with household investment decisions,
as prescribed by (20), in addition to consumption decisions prescribed by (16).
The ¯rst-order approximation to these four equations and the policy rule gives rise to
15the following log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions:
½°¼
¤2^ ¼t+J = °¼
¤2^ ¼t+J¡1 + ½
JÁvn¤
¯
[¯^ ct+J + ®^ rt+J]; (22)
^ ct+1 = (½q ¡ 1)^ ¼t + ^ ct; (23)
^ rt+1 =
½q ¡ 1
½r¤ ^ ¼t; (24)
^ kt+1 = ¡[¯± + (¯ + 1)
c¤
k¤]^ ct + ¯(± +
c¤
k¤)^ rt + (1 +
c¤
k¤)^ kt: (25)
In deriving (22), we have used a equilibrium condition, ¯rtkt = ®vctnt, which is implied by
(7), (10), (11), as well as the capital demand equation (12). We have also used this condition
in writing (25).
We argue that local determinacy analysis in this case with endogenous capital accumula-
tion is essentially an analysis of the log-linearized New Phillips curve (22) and consumption
Euler equation (23), just as in the case where capital is in ¯xed supply. What the endoge-
nous nature of capital supply essentially does is to introduce two additional equations, (24)
and (25), an additional jump variable, r, along with a predetermined variable, k, into the
system for determinacy analysis. However, as we will show below, by doing so it introduces
at the same time a zero eigenvalue, corresponding to (24), and a greater than unit eigenvalue,
corresponding to (25), into the system of the four linear di®erence equations (22)-(25). As
a result, whether there is determinacy hinges entirely on whether the two eigenvalues of the
system of the consumption Euler equation and the New Phillips curve both have greater than
unit modulus. Capital here matters for determinacy through how its share in value-added
production cost a®ects ¯rms' pricing behavior in product markets and thus the New Phillips
curve, just as in the case with exogenous capital supply. Although the speci¯c details of this
16e®ect are di®erent across the two models, the basic mechanisms by which capital tends to
lead to macroeconomic instability turn out similar.
5. A Further Comparison
To further illustrate the comparison laid out in the previous sections, consider J = 1. The
comparison under J = 0, although a little more complicated, is similar.
By embedding how policy a®ects households' intertemporal consumption decisions (18)
into the New Phillips curve (17), the system of the two equations (17) and (18) for the case






























Since both ¼t and ct are jump variables, this two-equation system is determinate if and only
if the two eigenvalues of the system both have larger than unit modulus.
By embedding how policy a®ects households' consumption and investment decisions (23)
and (24) into the New Phillips curve (22), the four-equation system (22)-(25) for the case







































½q ¡ 1 1 0 0
½q¡1
1¡½+½± 0 0 0
0 ¡[¯± + (¯ + 1) c¤
k¤] ¯(± + c¤

































This linear system always has a zero eigenvalue, corresponding to the third line, and a greater
than unit eigenvalue, 1 + c¤=k¤, corresponding to the fourth line. It is easy to show that































both have larger than unit modulus, just as in the case of (26). Notice that the two-equation
system (27) results from removing the last two lines in the above four-equation system. This
essentially removes a jump variable, rt, and a predetermined variable, kt, along with the two
eigenvalues, 0 and 1 + c¤=k¤, from the original system. Therefore, (in)determinacy of the
original four-equation system is equivalent to (in)determinacy of the reduced two-equation
system (27). Note the similarity between (26) and (27): the second lines (the consumption
Euler equation) are identical, and ¯ a®ects only the ¯rst lines (the New Phillips curve).
The di®erence between the two ¯rst lines is that the ¯rst line in (26) embeds how policy
a®ects households' consumption decisions, while the ¯rst line in (27) embeds how policy
a®ects households' consumption as well as investment decisions. Thus, the basic mechanisms
within exogenous-capital and endogenous-capital models by which capital tends to lead to
macroeconomic instability are similar, while the speci¯c details of this e®ect are di®erent
across the two cases.
As we will show in the following section, because of the similarity in the basic mechanisms,
a greater cost share of capital (a larger ® and thus a smaller ¯), regardless of whether capital
supply is modelled as exogenous or as endogenous, always leads to a smaller determinacy
region.
As we will illustrate, also in the subsequent section, because of the di®erence in the speci¯c
details of this e®ect, the determinacy region with exogenous capital supply can be smaller
or larger than the determinacy region with endogenous capital accumulation, depending on
18the values of parameters, in general, and the cost share of capital, in particular.
6. Main Results
6.1. Necessary and su±cient conditions for determinacy
In this section, we present our main results: the necessary and su±cient condition for local
real determinacy for the endogenous-capital model as well as for the exogenous-capital model.
To our knowledge, in the literature on discrete-time sticky-price models this paper is the ¯rst
to derive a necessary and su±cient condition for real determinacy with endogenous capital
accumulation under forward-looking interest rate policy rules.
To drive home the points illustrated in the previous sections, we show ¯rst the necessary
and su±cient condition for local real determinacy for the exogenous-capital model.
Proposition 1. With exogenous capital supply, there is local real determinacy under the
forward-looking policy rule (14) if and only if
0 < ½q ¡ 1 <
2°¼¤2¯(1 + ½)
¡½J(1 + Á)
´ ¹ B1: (28)
Otherwise, there is a continuum of equilibria.
We next present the necessary and su±cient condition for local real determinacy for the
endogenous-capital model.
Proposition 2. With endogenous capital accumulation, there is local real determinacy
under the forward-looking policy rule (14) if and only if
0 < ½q ¡ 1 <
°¼¤2(1 ¡ ½)[½± ¡ Á(1 ¡ ½) ¡ (1 + Á)¯½±]
(1 ¡ ¯)½JÁ(1 + Á)
´ ¹ B2; for ¯ < ¯
¤; (29)
0 < ½q ¡ 1 <
2°¼¤2(1 + ½)[½± ¡ Á(1 ¡ ½) ¡ (1 + Á)¯½±]
[2 ¡ ¯(1 + ½ ¡ ½±)]½JÁ(1 + Á)






(1 + ½)2 + ½(1 ¡ ½)±
2 (0;1):
Otherwise, there is a continuum of equilibria.
Propositions 1 and 2 say that there is real determinacy of equilibrium if and only if policy
is active, in the spirit of the Taylor principle, but not more active than what is speci¯ed by
the upper bound in (28) for the constant-capital model or in (29)-(30) for the variable-capital
model.13 Clearly, these upper bounds are proportional to °, and thus the greater (smaller)
this price adjustment cost coe±cient is, the larger (smaller) is the determinacy region, with
either exogenous capital or endogenous capital, and under both timing conventions for price-
setting.
Besides their own interests, these necessary and su±cient conditions make it feasible to
compare the determinacy region for exogenous capital supply and the determinacy region
for endogenous capital accumulation under forward-looking interest rate rules. They also
allow us to gain important insights into the determinacy issue under forward-looking policy
rules that have not attracted much attention before.
6.2. Cost share of capital
The necessary and su±cient conditions established in Propositions 1 and 2 for the case where
capital is in exogenously ¯xed supply and for the case with endogenous capital accumulation
reveal an essential implication of capital for indeterminacy.
It can be veri¯ed that the upper bound in (28) for the ¯xed-capital model and the upper
bound in (29)-(30) for the variable-capital model are each increasing in ¯ and thus decreasing
in ® (note that ¹ B2 and ¹ ¹ B2 meet only at ¯ = ¯¤). Therefore, regardless of whether capital
supply is modelled as exogenous or as endogenous, a larger share of capital in value-added
13Under an alternative, non-linear policy rule, such as Rt = R¤(¼t=¼¤)q, Propositions 1 and 2 continue
to hold with the only modi¯cation being ½q ¡ 1 replaced with q ¡ 1. The linear speci¯cation adopted in
this paper is in the spirit of Leeper (1991), who considers linear backward-looking interest rate policy in a
discrete-time °exible price model.
20production cost (a larger ® and thus a smaller ¯) always results in a smaller determinacy
region. This is true under both conventions about the timing of price-setting.
These results arise because the basic mechanisms within the exogenous-capital and the
endogenous-capital models by which capital tends to lead to macroeconomic instability are
similar: it matters for real indeterminacy through a®ecting ¯rms' pricing behavior in product
markets rather than households' arbitrage activity in ¯nancial markets. Nevertheless, the
speci¯c details of this e®ect are di®erent across the two models and, as a consequence,
indeterminacy can be either more likely or less likely to occur with exogenous capital than
with endogenous capital, depending on the values of parameters, in general, and the cost
share of capital, in particular, as we turn to illustrate now.
6.3. Constant capital versus variable capital
Examining the upper bound in (28) for the constant-capital model and the upper bound
in (29)-(30) for the variable-capital model also reveals a theoretical possibility not explored
before: the reduction in the determinacy region due to the use of capital in production can be
either greater or smaller when capital supply is modelled as exogenous than as endogenous.
In other words, from the theoretical point of view, indeterminacy can be either less likely or
more likely to occur in the constant-capital model than in the variable-capital model.
For instance, it can be shown that, if the cost share of capital is very large, then the
determinacy region with exogenous capital is smaller than that with endogenous capital.
This can be illustrated by considering a close-to-one ®, and thus a close-to-zero ¯. Then, ¹ B1
is close to zero and the determinacy region de¯ned by (28) is close to an empty set, while ¹ B2
and ¹ ¹ B2 are each bounded from below by strictly positive numbers ( ¹ B2 is what really matters
here) and the determinacy region de¯ned by (29)-(30) stays as a non-empty interval (what
really matters here is (29)). To understand this contrast, compare the ¯rst line in (26) with
the ¯rst line in (27). As ® gets larger and thus ¯ gets smaller, the response of in°ation
expectations to even small variations in current in°ation and output becomes unboundedly
21sensitive in the case with exogenous capital supply (the ¯rst line in (26)), but stays bounded
in the case with endogenous capital supply (the ¯rst line in (27)). Since production uses
mostly capital, the e®ects of changes in aggregate economic conditions are drastic changes
in in°ation expectations if capital is in ¯xed supply, but they are more evenly split between
changes in in°ation expectations and changes in expected quantity variables if capital is in
varying supply.
In the case that the share of (variable) labor in value-added production inputs is moder-
ate or large, the e®ects of changes in aggregate demand conditions are always split somewhat
evenly between changes in in°ation expectations and changes in expected quantity variables,
regardless of whether capital is in varying or ¯xed supply, and thus the sensitivity of in°ation
expectations to variations in current in°ation and output is bounded in both the case with
endogenous capital supply and the case with exogenous capital supply. In fact, the determi-
nacy region with exogenous capital is larger than the determinacy region with endogenous
capital if the share of labor (capital) in value-added production inputs is very large (small),
or, more speci¯cally, if
maxf¯
¤;¯




1 ¡ ½ ¡
½±
Á
1 + ½ ¡ ½±
2 (0;1);
and ¯¤ is as de¯ned in Proposition 2. In particular, one can show that ¹ B1 is larger than ¹ ¹ B2
if and only if the quadratic concave function f(¯) ´ Á(1 + ½ ¡ ½±)¯2 + [(1 + Á)½± ¡ 2Á]¯ +
[Á(1 ¡ ½) ¡ ½±] is strictly positive. It can be veri¯ed that the equation f(¯) = 0 has two
distinct real roots, equal to 1 and ¯¤¤, respectively. Again, the analysis conducted in this
section holds regardless of which convention about the timing of price-setting is used.
226.4. Timing of price adjustment
Recall that our theoretical approach allows us to model the two conventions about the timing
of price adjustment often used in models of monopolistic competition in a uni¯ed framework.
This uni¯ed approach leads to the following useful point.
The necessary and su±cient conditions (28) and (29)-(30) presented in Propositions 1
and 2 reveal that the choice of one timing convention versus the other has an implication for
local real determinacy. In particular, these conditions show that determinacy is more likely
to occur when prices are modelled as predetermined variables (i.e., when J = 1) than as
jump variables (i.e., when J = 0). With a smaller discount factor (say, in a lower-frequency
model), the increase in the likelihood of determinacy owing to price being preset can be more
dramatic.14 This conclusion holds regardless of whether capital is modelled as exogenous or
as endogenous.
6.5. Steady-state monopolistic distortions
An interesting implication of Propositions 1 and 2, as can be seen from examining the upper
bounds in (28) and (29)-(30), is that a greater Á always leads to a larger region for local real
determinacy. It follows that indeterminacy is less likely to occur, the greater is the degree of
steady-state monopolistic distortions, that is, the steady-state markup of price over marginal
cost. This observation holds regardless of whether capital supply is modelled as exogenous
or as endogenous, or which of the two conventions about the timing of price adjustment is
used.
14Note that, with J = 1, prices are preset by only one period. In the literature, the case that prices are set
multi-periods in advance has also been considered. We conjecture that Propositions 1 and 2 would continue
to hold for J > 1 and determinacy could be even more likely to occur if prices are set more than one period
in advance than if prices are set just one period in advance.
236.6. Price stickiness and steady-state in°ation
It is clear that both the upper bound in (28) for the constant-capital model and the upper
bound in (29)-(30) for the variable-capital model are proportional to °¼¤2 and, thus, a greater
degree of price stickiness or a greater steady-state in°ation rate implies a larger region for
local real determinacy under forward-looking interest rate rules. These observations hold
regardless of whether capital is in ¯xed or variable supply, or which of the two timings of
price adjustment is used.
These implications of price stickiness and steady-state in°ation rate for indeterminacy
under forward-looking interest rate rules are exactly the opposite of those obtained under
current-looking interest rate rules with endogenous capital accumulation: Under current-
looking policy rules indeterminacy is more likely to occur with a greater degree of price
stickiness (e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2005; Sveen and Weinke, 2005) or with a higher steady-
state in°ation rate (e.g., Hornstein and Wolman, 2005). In a separate study under current-
looking interest rate rules we obtain results similar to those obtained by these authors.
Because of the similarity we do not report our results under current-looking interest rate
rules, but they are available upon request.
7. Conclusion
As monetary policymakers around the world have moved into the framework of setting a
nominal interest rate in response to changes in expected future in°ation for the conduct of
monetary policy, it is of paramount interest to know whether such policy practice may lead
to real indeterminacy in a modern production economy where capital is an important factor
input.
The present paper addresses this issue by deriving the necessary and su±cient conditions
for local real determinacy in a discrete-time economy with monopolistic competition and a
quadratic nominal price adjustment cost under forward-looking interest rate feedback rules,
24for the case where capital is in exogenously ¯xed supply, as well as the case with endogenous
capital accumulation.
Applying these conditions, we ¯nd that indeterminacy is more likely to occur with a
greater share of capital in value-added production cost, regardless of whether capital supply
is modelled as exogenous or as endogenous. We show that these results arise because, under
forward-looking interest rate rules, the basic mechanisms by which capital tends to lead to
macroeconomic instability are similar within the constant-capital model and the variable-
capital model: capital matters for real indeterminacy by a®ecting ¯rms' pricing behavior in
product markets. Thus our perspective for the endogenous capital model di®ers from the
one o®ered by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) who argue that with forward-looking interest
rate rules capital matters for indeterminacy by a®ecting households' arbitrage activity in
¯nancial markets, but is consistent with the view of Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) and Sveen
and Weinke (2005) which is obtained under current-looking policy rules. We also show
that the speci¯c details of the e®ect of capital on ¯rms' pricing behavior under forward-
looking interest rate rules are di®erent across the constant-capital model and the variable-
capital model and, as so, indeterminacy can be either more likely or less likely to occur with
exogenous capital than with endogenous capital, depending on the values of parameters, in
general, and the cost share of capital, in particular.
The necessary and su±cient conditions also lead us to another interesting observation.
While two di®erent conventions on the timing of price adjustment have been used in the
literature, we ¯nd that indeterminacy is more likely to occur when prices are modelled
as jump variables than as predetermined variables, and this contrast is sharper in lower-
frequency models, regardless of whether capital supply is modelled as an exogenous or as
an endogenous variable. These conditions also suggest that indeterminacy is more likely to
occur with a smaller degree of steady-state monopolistic distortions.
Finally, these necessary and su±cient conditions allow us to reach two conclusions under
forward-looking interest rate rules which are exactly the opposite of those under current-
25looking interest rate rules with endogenous capital accumulation: A greater degree of price
stickiness or a higher steady-state in°ation rate makes indeterminacy less likely to occur
under forward-looking interest rate rules while in contrast either makes indeterminacy more
likely to occur under current-looking interest rate rules.
Our present analysis raises an important question as to how to ensure macroeconomic
stability in a modern production economy with endogenous capital accumulation in which
a monetary authority systematically adjusts a nominal interest rate to changes in expected
future in°ation. Existing studies reveal that interest rate policies that respond to current
in°ation may render a greater determinacy region if they also respond to current output
activity. We have started exploring this issue for interest rate policies that respond to
expected future in°ation and our preliminary ¯ndings suggest that allowing the nominal
interest rate to also respond to movements in current output activity can help a great deal
in terms of achieving real determinacy, in both the model where capital is in ¯xed supply
and the model with endogenous capital accumulation. This issue is so important that it, in
our view, deserves the full attention of a separate paper.
26Appendix
To help exposition, we shall prove Proposition 2 ¯rst.
Proof of Proposition 2: We introduce some auxiliary notations to facilitate the proof:
² ´ ½q ¡ 1; a ´
Ávn¤









































½ ¡ b² a 0 0
² 1 0 0
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½r¤ 0 0 0
0 ¡[¯± + (¯ + 1) c¤
k¤] ¯(± + c¤


































The above 4£4 matrix has four eigenvalues, two of which are independent of the policy
rule: a zero eigenvalue and a larger than unit eigenvalue given by 1+ c¤
k¤. The other two are
policy dependent and given by the two eigenvalues of the upper left 2£2 sub-matrix, which













¡ b² ¡ a²
¶
= 0: (32)




¡ (b + a)² > 0; D(1) = ¡a² < 0; D(+1) > 0;
implying that there are two real roots of (32), one is strictly between 0 and 1 and the other is
larger than 1. Hence a necessary condition for determinacy is for ² ¸ 0. This can be veri¯ed














½ + b²)2 + 4a²
2
:
Clearly, ¸1(0) = 1
½ > 1 and ¸2(0) = 1. It can also be veri¯ed that, for any ² < 0,
¸1(²) > ¸1(0) > 1; 0 < ¸2(²) < ¸2(0) = 1:
This validates our claim. On the other side, it is straightforward to show that a policy that
is marginally more active than the benchmark case with ² = 0 su±ces to ensure determinacy.
To see this, compute the derivatives of the two quadratic roots with respect to ² and evaluate
















Of course, only the signs of the right derivatives obtained above are of value, given the global
results for the case with ² < 0. The signs of the right derivatives imply that when policy
becomes a little bit more active than the benchmark case with ² = 0, the larger-than-unit
root decreases from its value of 1=½ (at ² = 0), but remains larger than 1 as long as policy
is not too much more active, while the unit root (at ² = 0) rises above 1, as the roots are
continuous functions of ². Thus, such a policy would lead to determinacy.
To generalize this local result to the global one characterized by the theorem, we ¯rst
note that D(1) = ¡a² ¸ 0 for any ² ¸ 0. This combined with the above observation implies
that (32) can never have two real roots with one larger than 1 and the other smaller than
28¡1. Therefore, determinacy obtains if and only if (32) has two real roots with both larger
than 1, or two real roots with both smaller than ¡1, or a pair of complex roots the module
of which is larger than 1. We proceed next to characterize the range for ² under which one
of the three mutually exclusive possibilities is realized.
We ¯rst note that, for either of the ¯rst two possibilities, it is necessary that D(¡1) > 0,







We next note that ¸¤ = (1 + 1=½ ¡ b²)=2 is the value of ¸ that minimizes D(¸). Clearly,






which is a necessary condition for both ¸1(²) and ¸2(²) to be real and larger than 1, while






which is a necessary condition for both ¸1(²) and ¸2(²) to be real and smaller than ¡1.
Third, we note that the term under the square-root operator in the expressions for ¸1(²)















































29Thus, in order for ¸1(²) and ¸2(²) to be two real numbers with absolute values larger than
1, it is necessary that
0 < ² · ²1 or ² ¸ ²2; (37)











This implies that, if 0 < ² · ²1, then ¢(²) ¸ 0, ¸¤ > 1, and D(1) > 0, and thus both ¸1(²)






This implies that, if ² ¸ ²2, then ¢(²) ¸ 0, ¸¤ < 1, and D(1) > 0, and thus both ¸1(²) and
¸2(²) must be real but smaller than 1. We have therefore established that both ¸1(²) and
¸2(²) are real and larger than 1 if and only if 0 < ² · ²1.
This also implies that, in order for ¸1(²) and ¸2(²) to be both real and smaller than ¡1,
it is necessary that ² ¸ ²2, besides that (33) and (35) have to hold. On the other side, if
² ¸ ²2, and (33) and (35) also hold, then ¢(²) ¸ 0, ¸¤ < ¡1, and D(¡1) > 0, and thus both
¸1(²) and ¸2(²) must be real and smaller than ¡1. We have therefore established that both
¸1(²) and ¸2(²) are real and smaller than ¡1 if and only if ² ¸ ²2, and (33) and (35) hold.
Finally, it is clear that ¸1(²) and ¸2(²) are a pair of complex conjugates, the module of
which is larger than 1 if and only if
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Taking the above three cases together, we have established the necessary and su±cient


























with the understanding that if the ¯rst element under the \max" operator is greater than
the second one, then the second interval is left-closed. Using the steady-state real rate of
return on capital r¤ = 1=½ ¡ 1 + ±, and going through some algebra, we show that
¯ <
4½
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;
completes the proof of the theorem for the case with J = 1.
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Through some algebra, it can be shown that the four eigenvalues of the above 4 £ 4


































Thus, there are two policy-independent eigenvalues, a zero eigenvalue and a larger than unit
eigenvalue given by 1 + c¤
k¤, which are the same as in the case with J = 1. The other two
eigenvalues are policy dependent and can be obtained by solving for the two roots of the
quadratic equation F(¸) = 0. Notice the similarity between the two functions F(¢) and
D(¢): if we correspond b=½ and a=½ in F(¢) to b and a in D(¢), respectively, then the two
functions become identical. The rest of the proof is similar. This completes the proof of the
proposition. Q.E.D.
32Proof of Proposition 1: We again introduce some auxiliary notations to facilitate the
proof:
² ´ ½q ¡ 1; b ´
¡Ávn¤
°¼¤2¯2; a ´ ¡b;































































The corresponding characteristic functions of the two systems are identical in form to
the functions D(¢) and F(¢) presented in the proof of Theorem 1, with an identical de¯nition
for ², modi¯ed de¯nitions for b and a, and an additional relationship b + a = 0 holding
here. Following the same procedure as set out above, it is straightforward to show that
determinacy obtains if and only if









Substituting in b, a, and the steady-state relation between vn¤ and ¯ and Á at the beginning
of this proof gives rise to the result in the proposition. Q.E.D.
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